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I. Introduction 
Interestingly, fatalistic attitudes have played a 
significant role in the lives of men throughout the 
ages. From the Greek notion of destiny to Hitler's 
reliance on a personal astrologer, men have exhibited 
tendencies toward finding solace in at least some sort 
of fatalistic inclination. Yet few are those who adopt 
what could be termed a "proper" fatalistic outlook. 
This of course is the rather startling view that every-
thing which in fact does happen could not have been 
otherwise. A less benign rendering of this view simply 
states that it is logically impossible for anything 
that doe8 happen, not to happen. Obviously, adherers 
to this view think any sort of human deliberation 
pointless since they believe it not within their power 
to affect anything whatsoever. Everything that is, is 
simply because it logically must be; and as mentioned, 
few are willing to go so far as to accept this situa-
tion. 
In fact, one interesting way to notice the force of 
this doctrine is to note the peculiar beliefs some 
philosophers have held in order to deny arguments in 
its support. Aristotle, for instance, claimed that 
future-tense contingent propositions are neither true 
nor false.1 More recently, Prior has altered this ap-
proach slightly by stating that if p is a contingent 
proposition, then it is false both that p will be true 
and the negation of p will be true.1 Oddest of all is 
the very recent claim by Peter Geach that there are in 
fact no propositions about the future, but only propo-
sitions about the present tendencies of things.1 
Further, Geach bases this position on the more substan-
tive claim that the future is unreal, and thus there 
could be no propositions about it. Each of these posi-
tions marks a radical move in order to deny the doc-
trine of fatalism. Thus the purpose of this paper is 
to look at two fairly representative arguments for 
fatalism and refute them without appealing to a 
counter-intuitive metaphysical or logical construal. 
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II. The General Argument 
In order to adequately deal with the first argu-
ment, some general concepts will require preliminary 
explication.* The concept of a "modal operator" great-
ly aids our inquiry and it is nothing more than this: 
the symbol "*" is introduced and thought of as govern-
ing a proposition (p). Further, the operator only cor-
rectly governs propositions that are considered to be 
"necessary truths"—for example: 
*(all bachelors are single.) 
or 
*(4 + 4 = 8 . ) 
This simply means that it is just not possible for 
these statements to be false. Now if the symbol "#" is 
introduced and understood to designate possibility, a 
relationship between these two modal operators becomes 
apparent. This being: 
If * (not p ) , then not (# (p)), 
and conversely: 
If # (not p) , then not (* (p)). 
Also, the proposition inside the parentheses is said to 
"lie within the scope of the modal operator," and cor-
rectly determining a modal operator's scope is of vital 
importance. For example: 
(A). * (If p, then q), 
where the scope is the entire conditional, clearly 
functions in a different manner than 
(B). If p, then * (q), 
where the scope is just the consequent of the condi-
tional. To see this, notice that conjoining p with (A) 
does not allow one to validly infer * (q), while con-
joining p with (B) does. 
With all this in mind, then, consider the following 
fairly common argument for fatalism: 
1) All projected future events either will ob-
tain, or will fail to obtain. 
2) If an event (E) will obtain, then it cannot be 
the case that (E) fails to obtain. 
3) Event (E) will obtain. 
4) Event (E) cannot fail to obtain. 
5) Necessarily: Event (E) will obtain. 
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Now going from the fact that a given event (E) will 
happen to the conclusion that (E) happens of necessity 
clearly signiffies this to be an argument for fatalism. 
But is it one we should accept? The first thing to no-
tice is that the second premise is ambiguous. It can 
be read two ways, with one interpretation being trivial 
and the other being highly suspect, as follows: 
2(a). Necessarily: If an event (E) will obtain, 
then it will obtain. 
2(b). If an event (E) will obtain, then neces-
sarily it will obtain. 
In the ambiguous version the word "cannot" functions as 
a modal operator signifying a non-possibility of one 
sort, and consequently, a necessity claim of a related 
sort. And it is in shifting the scope of this modal 
operator that gives rise to both interpretations of the 
premise. Obviously though, for the argument to be a 
convincing one the second premise has to be read as 
2(a). For interpretation 2(b) is exactly the fatalist 
position, and reading the second premise as such 
reduces the entire "argument" to the trivial truth that 
"If fatalism is true, then fatalism is true." 
However, if the second premise is read as 2(a) then 
the argument is clearly invalid. For where an entire 
conditional proposition lies within the scope of a ne-
cessity claim, and the antecedent of the conditional is 
also given, one cannot validly infer the simple conse-
quent of the conditional to lie within the scope of a 
necessity claim. That is, the argument form 
* (If p, then q.) 
P 
* (q) 
is invalid. But this is precisely what occurs when the 
second premise is read as 2(a). The confusion arises 
because in English, when the word "could" functions as 
a modal operator whose scope is an entire conditional, 
"could" may nevertheless be placed in a clause of the 
conditional. So our initial argument for fatalism is 
either trivial or invalid, and it is now time to move 
on the other argument for fatalism to be considered in 
this paper. 
III. Time Considerations and Richard Taylor 
Our first argument dealt with fatalism concerning 
the future. In fact, fatalism concerning the past 
seems generally accepted by everyone.* For if ti is 
earlier than t2, there is a definite sense in which the 
obtainment of events at tj are in some way "necessary" 
at t 2 < * For example, it would seem highly presumptuous 
of me to claim I now have the ability to bring it about 
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that some past event did not occur, i.e., to now keep 
Hitler from having been in power. It is for this 
reason that Aristotle writes: 
. . . no one deliberates about the past, but a-
bout what is future and capable of being other-
wise, while what is past i3 not capable of not 
having taken place; hence Agathon is right in 
saying, "For this alone is lacking even to God/To 
make undone things that have once been done." 7 
So fatalism with regard to the past seems obvious 
while fatalism with regard to the future arouses our 
interest and concern. But are there any arguments for 
fatalism with regard to the future that don't seem to 
commit invalid inferences? I believe Richard Taylor 
presents an argument of this sort that needs to be ad-
dressed.' The presuppositions Taylor gives for his ar-
gument will be directly transcribed, while the rest of 
his argument will be paraphrased. The argument basi-
cally consists of two parts and goes as follows: 
i. Presuppositions 
A. We presuppose that any proposition whatever is 
either true or, if not true then false. 
B. We presuppose that, if any state of affairs is 
sufficient for, though logically unrelated to, the oc-
curence of some further condition at the same or any 
other time, then the former cannot occur without the 
latter occuring also. 
C. We presuppose that, if the occurence of any 
condition is necessary for, but logically unrelated to, 
the occurence of some other condition at the same or 
any other time, then the latter cannot occur without 
the former occuring also. 
D. We presuppose that, if one condition or set of 
conditions is sufficient for (ensures) another, then 
that other is necessary (essential) for it, and conver-
sely, if one condition or set of conditions is neces-
sary (essential) for another, then that other is suffi-
cient for (ensures) it. 
E. We presuppose that no agent can perform any 
given act if there is lacking, at the same or any other 
time, some condition necessary for the occurence of 
that act. 
F. We presuppose that time is not by itself 
"efficacious"; that is, that the mere passage of time 
does not augment or diminish the capacities of anything 
and, in particular, that it does not enhance or de-
crease an agent's powers or abilities. This means that 
if any substance or agent gains or loses powers or 
abilities over the course of time--such as, for in-
stance, the power of a substance to corrode, or a man 
to do thirty push-ups, and so on--then such gain or 
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loss is always the result of something other than the 
mere passage of time.' 
ii. Argument 
Now let the statements "A naval battle will occur 
tomorrow" and "A naval battle will not occur tomorrow" 
be Q and Q' respectively. Also, suppose I am a naval 
commander about to issue an order to the fleet such 
that given all other prevalent conditions, the issuance 
of one sort of order ensures a naval battle tomorrow, 
while the issuance of another sort of order ensures 
that there will be no naval battle tomorrow. Let or-
ders of the first sort be called O and orders of the 
second sort O'. 
Taylor wishes to block the non-fatalist claim 
NF: It is in my power to do 0, and it is also 
within my power to do 0'. 
with the following argument: 
1) If Q is true, then it is not within my power 
to do O' (for in case Q is true, there is, or 
will be, lacking a condition essential for my do-
ing 0', the condition, namely, of there being no 
naval battle tomorrow). 
2) But if Q' is true, then it is not within my 
power to do 0 (for a similar reason). 
3) But either Q is true, or Q* is true. 
4) Either it is not within my power to do 0, or 
it is not within my power to do 0'. 1 8 
In this argument step 4 obviously contradicts NF, 
thereby establishing fatalism concerning the future. 
The argument's form is valid so accepting its conclu-
sion rests upon accepting Taylor's presuppositions and 
their implications. The line of attack I will adopt is 
similar to Lynne Spellman's position with regard to 
Taylor, and, like Spellman, I will begin with some pre-
liminary remarks about causality.11 
Taylor's presupposition (F) claims that any sub-
stance or agent that gains or loses abilities does so 
as a result of something other than the mere passage of 
time. This 11 as a result of" may be interpreted as some 
sort of causality and the argument then might be at-
tacked on the grounds that fatalism precludes causal 
efficacy. But does it? 
If an event y follows an event x, and as Taylor 
would claim both x and y are fated, can x be said to 
cause y? Spellman thinks not for she asks, "If x were 
to fail to occur (a situation which may be impossible, 
but not logically impossible and not meaningless), 
would y still occur? If it would, where is the cau-
sality? If it would not, where is the fatalism? For 
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this reason I am inclined to agree with those who think 
that fatalism precludes causal efficacy."12 Here I 
think Spellman misses the point completely. Fatalism 
is the doctrine that whatever events obtain, logically 
must obtain. So to grant that an event is fated, and 
then ask what the consequences would be if that event 
failed to obtain, is simply to ask an incoherent ques-
tion. It is logically impossible and it is meaning-
less. Nonetheless, Taylor's position is still problem-
atic. It is my contention that Taylor borrows from two 
theories about the nature of time that are incompati-
ble; that is, one cannot believe both theories to be 
true. 
The first theory, known as the "A-theory," is more 
or less the common sense view of time. As G. N. 
Schlesinger notes, 1 1 on this view the NOW is something 
that moves in a single direction relative to a series 
of temporal points that constitute all time. A given 
future instant along with everything that occurs then, 
steadily moves toward the NOW, momentarily is simultan-
eous with the NOW, and then forever steadily recedes 
from the NOW. Temporal statements made in accordance 
with the A-theory are called '^-statements" and they 
contain the notions of pastness, presentness, and futu-
rity. It is vitally important to notice that according 
to the A-theory some temporal statements change their 
truth value depending on when they are uttered. For 
example—^Jimmy Carter's election to the Presidency is 
a past event." Here the A-theories simply claim that 
the truth value of this proposition is dependent upon 
when it is uttered. And for the A-theorist, this feat-
ure of A-statements is due to an ontological difference 
between the past and the future derived from the rela-
tionship of the past and the future to the NOW. In 
other words, A-statements change their truth value 
because the passage of time is an objective feature of 
reality being precisely described by the movement of 
the NOW. 
The second theory of time, known as the "B-theory," 
is usually associated with the work of Bertrand Rus-
sell. On this view the universe does not contain the 
NOW as depicted by the A-theory, for the only temporal 
relations that exist are relations of earlier than or 
later than. There is no such thing as an event rela-
tive to the NOV/. Russell's claim, then, is that there 
are no A-statements.'* The previous example would be 
translated as "Jimmy Carter's election to the Presi-
dency is earlier than the utterance of this token," and 
this temporal relation, if ever true, is always true. 
So for the B-theorist no temporal statement changes its 
truth value because all temporal relations (x is 
earlier than, later than) are external. Consequently, 
there is no ontological difference between the past and 
the future; and the passage of time, or the movement of 
510 
the NOW, is nothing more than a psychological aspect of 
the human organism.11 
It is easily seen that I have not tried to estab-
lish the superiority of the A-theory or the B-theory. 
The sole purpose in explicating these positions is to 
establish that one cannot hold both to be true. With 
this in mind and some careful scrutiny, Taylor's argu-
ment readily appears as implicitly unsound. 
Notice in Taylor's presupposition (F) the statement 
that "the mere passage of time does not augment or di-
minish the capacities of anything." From this state-
ment we can straightforwardly characterize Taylor as an 
A-theorist. For the B-theorist could make no sense out 
of talk about "the mere passage of time." In fact, the 
B-theory claims that all temporal points are equally 
real, and that time's passage is actually nonsense. 
Obviously then, by denying efficacy of any sort to the 
"mere passage of time" Taylor's presupposition (F) com-
mits him, ipso facto, to an A-theorist's perspective. 
And with the A-theory, remember, goes the notion of an 
ontological difference between the past and the future. 
This difference gives rise to the significant fact that 
for the A-theorist, the nature of the correlates 
(facts, states of affairs, etc.) to which true tensed 
propositions correspond varies in time—with the vari-
ance being a function of the time the correlate is ac-
tually under consideration. This construal, however, 
makes temporal relations between necessary and suffi-
cient conditions highly relevant. For if a state of 
affairs taken- to be necessary for some other state of 
affairs is referred to in a tensed proposition, then 
the temporal relation indexed in that proposition is 
essential for determining whether the necessity claim 
is actually binding at the time of the proposition's 
utterance. And it is at this point that Taylor's pro-
blem moves to the forefront. 
Instead of making temporal relations between neces-
sary and sufficient conditions relevant, as a con-
sistent A-theorist would, Taylor instead denies this in 
presupposition (E) where he states that "no agent can 
perform any given act if there is lacking, at the same 
or any other time, some condition necessary for the oc-
curence of that act." What this means is that for any 
true tensed proposition referring to a necessary condi-
tion, the nature of such a proposition's correlate does 
not vary as a function of time—thus rendering the 
necessity claim equally applicable at all times. As 
Spellman correctly notes,1' presupposition (E) entails 
the irrelevance of temporal relations between necessary 
and sufficient conditions. 
But presupposition (E) is not the position of an A-
theorist but rather that of a B-theorist. For an A-
theorist would claim that any state of affairs' past-
ness or futurity is an ontological quality donned and 
doffed through the process of temporal becoming; and 
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thus that temporal relations between such states of af-
fairs and propositions referring to them are extremely 
important for evaluating the truth value of the propo-
sitions (or if you will, the applicability of a neces-
sity claim relative to the utterance of such a claim). 
Not only would a consistent A-theorist shy away from 
Taylor's presupposition (E), he would reject it al-
together. Obviously then Taylor wishes to claim on the 
one hand that temporal becoming is an objective feature 
of the world (presupp. (F)), and on the other hand that 
temporal relations between necessary and sufficient 
conditions are irrelevant (presupp. (E)). Thus we are 
forced to conclude that Taylor draws from botli the A 
and B-theories in constructing his argument, thereby 
rendering it implicitly unsound and unacceptable. For 
though presuppositions (A) through (F) seem initially 
compelling, closer inspection reveals their dependence 
on incompatible claims about the nature of time. 
IV. Conclusion 
We began our discussion by noting the rather ab-
solute character carried by the doctrine of fatalism. 
Some radical views were then mentioned displaying the 
extent to which some have gone in order to deny the 
doctrine. Two arguments for fatalism were then consid-
ered and rejected. The first argument was shown to be 
ambiguous with regard to the scope of its modal opera-
tor, with one interpretation rendering it trival and 
the other rendering it invalid. The second argument 
was accepted as valid, but its presuppositions were 
shown to rely on incompatible claims about the nature 
of time. In neither case was it necessary to make a 
radical move such as the denial of traditonal two-place 
logic, or the denial of a future altogether, in order 
to refute the fatalist position. Indeed, I believe no 
such argument exists that would necessitate such a 
move, but a defense of this claim is outside the scope 
of this paper. 
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